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Saticoy Bay LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 3 (Jan. 26, 2017)1 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE: COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION  
 
Summary 
 The Court held that under NRCP 41(e) a complaint in intervention is a part of an original 
action, and thus, the district court’s dismissal of appellant’s complaint was mandatory. However, 
the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice because the 
district court mischaracterized NRS 116.3116(6) as a statute of limitations when it only limits the 
amount of actionable unpaid HOA assessments. Finally, the Court found that appellant’s 
subsequent action would not be barred by statute of limitations. 
 
Background: 
 This matter involves the dismissal of an action contesting the ownership of three separate 
Las Vegas properties: Lot 21, Lot 22, and Lot 26 (the Property). In 2013, appellant Saticoy Bay 
LLC Series 2021 Gray Eagle Way (Saticoy) allegedly obtained titles to Lots 21 and 26 through 
homeowner association foreclosure deeds and through a quitclaim deed for Lot 22 on December 
3, 2013. In 2012, the beneficial interest of a deed of trust recorded against the Property was 
assigned to respondent JPMorgan Chase Bank (JPMorgan). 
 In 2009, the Canyon Gate Master Association’s (CGMA) took steps to foreclose on the 
property, but their actions were delayed by legal challenges from then owner Susan Hannaford. 
However, in 2013, CGMA again took steps to initiate foreclosure on the property. On May 23, 
2013, Saticoy appeared at the foreclosure sale and purchased Lots 21 and 26, and in October, 
2013 purportedly purchased Lot 22 directly from CGMA. In August 2013, Saticoy filed a 
complaint in intervention to Hannaford’s pending action seeking injunctive relief, quiet title, 
declaratory relief, and issuance of a writ of restitution. JPMorgan filed an answer to Saticoy’s 
complaint in intervention. In 2015, the District court dismissed Saticoy’s complaint with 
prejudice finding that (1) Saticoy had not “taken affirmative steps to adequately prosecute the 
case,” (2) Saticoy’s excuse was an inadequate excuse for delay, (3) Saticoy’s case lacked merit, 
and (4) NRS 116.3116(6)’s three-year limitation period for foreclosing an HOA lien had run.  
 
Discussion 
 NRCP 41(e) states that: “any action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be 
dismissed by the court in which the same shall have been commenced … unless such action is 
brought to trial within 5 years after the plaintiff has filed the action.”2 The Court has previously 
explained that “an action includes the original claim and any crossclaims, counterclaims, and 
third-party claims.3Thus, the question to be decided was whether complaints in intervention filed 
in the original action fall into the above framework. NRCP 24 governs complaints in intervention 
and permits parties “intervene in an action,”4and such parties in intervention have been treated 
                                                     
1  By Karson Bright  
2  NEV. R. CIV. P. 41(e) 
3  United Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Indus. v. Manson, 105 Nev. 816, 820, 
783 P.2d 955, 957–58 (1989).  
4  NEV. R. CIV.  P 24(a)–(b) (emphasis added).  
under NRCP 24 as intervenors in the original action both in Nevada,5 and in other jurisdictions.6  
Thus, the Court concludes that complaints in intervention are part of the original action for 
purposes of mandatory dismissal under NRCP41(e), and since Saticoy failed to timely prosecute 
its claims in intervention, dismissal was mandatory.  
 
The district court’s dismissal of Saticoy’s complaint in intervention with prejudice, however, was 
an abuse of discretion 
 
 “A district court has broad, but not unbridled, discretion in determining whether dismissal 
under NRCP 41(e) should be with or without prejudice.”7 To determine if there was an abuse of 
discretion, the Court looked to the district court’s application of the Monroe elements which 
include the following: “the underlying conduct of the parties, whether the plaintiff offers 
adequate excuse for the delay, whether the plaintiff’s case lacks merit, and whether any 
subsequent action following dismissal would not be barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations.”8   
 
Conduct of the parties and adequacy of excuse for delay 
 
The Court disagreed with the district court finding that Saticoy had not taken adequate 
steps to prosecute its claims and offered no adequate excuse for delay. The Court has found that 
“[b]ecause the law favors trial on the merits, … dismissal with prejudice may not be warranted 
where … delay is justified by the circumstances of the case.”9 To consider whether dismissal 
with prejudice is appropriate, the Court considers “the conduct and good faith belief of the 
parties.”10 The Court found that and delay was justified in this case because Saticoy promptly 
filed its complaint in August 2013 after acquiring interest in Lots 21 and 26 July 2013.  
 
The district court misapplied NRS 116.3116(6) to the merits of Saticoy’s claims 
 
  Under NRS 116.3116(6) proceedings to enforce a lien must be instituted “within 3 years 
after the full amount of the assessments become[] due.”11  Parties did not dispute that CGMA 
had a valid lien for assessments against the property so the Court looked at whether that lien was 
extinguished by the three-year limitation period in NRS 116.3116(6). To resolve the issue the 
Court had to determine what action was sufficient to meet the requirement of instituting 
                                                     
5  See Las Vegas Police Protective Ass’n Metro., Inc., v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 230, 239, 130 P.3d 
182, 189 (2006) (“Generally, an intervenor is afforded all the rights of a party to the action … “ (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); 
6  See e.g., Schneider v. Dumbarton Developers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1007, 1017 (D.C. Cir.1985); Conseco v. Wells Fargo 
Fin. Leasing, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1193 (S.D. Iowa 2002); Taylor-West Weber Water Improvement Dist. v. 
Olds, 224 P.3d 709, 712 (Utah 2009). 
7  Monroe v. Columbia Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 123 Nev. 96, 103–03, 158 P.3d 1008, 1012 (2007).  
8  Id. at 1012 (footnote omitted).  
9  Home Sav. Ass’n v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 109 Nev. 558, 563, 854 P.2d 851, 854 (1993).  
10  Id.  
11  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.3116(6); In 2015, the Legislature changed the required action an HOA must take 
under the three-year limitation period for foreclosing a lien for unpaid assessments. 2015 Nev. Stat., ch. 266, § 1, at 
1335. Under the current statute, an HOA’s lien is extinguished unless an HOA records a notice of default and 
election to sell or institutes judicial proceedings to enforce its lien within three years after the full amount of the 
assessments becomes due. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.3116(10) (2015). 
“proceedings to enforce the lien.”12 Under NRS 116.31162(1), an HOA may foreclose its lien by 
sale only after it takes the following steps.13 First, the HOA must provide to the homeowner a 
“notice of delinquent assessment,”14 next, the HOA must record a notice of default and election 
to sell the unit to satisfy the lien.15 and finally, the HOA must give the homeowner a 90-day 
grace period following the recording of the notice of default and election to sell before it 
continues foreclosure proceedings.16 Therefore, no actions can be taken unless and until the 
HOA provides a notice of delinquent assessments pursuant to NRS 116.31162(1)(a).17 As such, a 
party has instituted “proceedings to enforce the lien” for purposes of NRS 116.3116(6) when it 
provides the notice of delinquent assessment. This assessment conforms to the Court’s past 
decision where it stated that “to initiate foreclosure under NRS 116.31162 through NRS 
116.31168, a Nevada HOA must notify the owner of the delinquent assessments.”18 
 The Court found that the district court erred and treated NRS 116.3116(6) as a statute of 
limitations when it instead determines the expiration of past due assessments. NRS 116.3116(6) 
limits the amount of unpaid assessments upon which an HOA can foreclose to those that have 
become due within three years of the instituting proceedings to enforce the lien.19 Therefore, the 
district court incorrectly relied on NRS 116.3116(6) when it found Saticoy’s claim lacked merit.  
 
Saticoy's subsequent action is not barred by the applicable statute of Limitations 
 
Finally, the district court erred in concluding that Saticoy could not refile a subsequent 
action following dismissal, because the action would be a NRS 11.080 complaint for quite title 
which contains a five-year statute of limitations.20 Since Saticoy did not acquire interest in the 
Property until 2013, the statute of limitations for a quite title action would not run until 2018.  
 
Conclusion 
 The Court found that “Saticoy’s complaint in intervention was part of the original action 
for purposes of NRCP 41 (e), and thus dismissal of the complaint was mandatory.” However, the 
district court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice because “Saticoy took adequate 
steps to prosecute the action, delay was justified, and a subsequent action would not be barred by 
the statute of limitations.”  
                                                     
12  We acknowledge that a determination must also be made as to when “the full amount of assessments becomes 
due” pursuant to NRS 116.3116(6). However, the district court did not explicitly find, and the record does not 
reflect, when the full amount of assessments became due in this case. Thus, we do not address that issue here.  
13  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.3116(1) 
14  § 116.31162(1)(a).  
15  § 116.31162(1)(b).  
16  § 116.31162(1)(c).  
17  § 116.31162(1)(a). 
18  SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 75,  334 P.3d 408, 411 (2014).  
19  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.3116(6) 
20  § 11.080. 
 
